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Russia entered the global crisis with strong fiscal 
position, low public debt, and large fiscal and monetary 
reserves, which helped it cushion the crisis shocks. But 
the rise in the non-oil fiscal deficit in 2007–08 and, 
more importantly, the massive impact of the global 
crisis in late 2008 and 2009 have dramatically altered 
Russia’s medium-term and long-term economic and 
fiscal outlook. While Russia is emerging from this crisis 
on a much stronger footing than during the 1998–09 
crisis thanks to its strong-pre crisis fundamentals, large 
fiscal reserves and solid management of the crisis, it 
will nevertheless need to implement sustained fiscal 
adjustment in the coming years. Both revenue and 
expenditure measures will be needed. This will require 
2-3 percentage points of GDP in fiscal adjustment for 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Sector Department, Europe and Central Asia 
Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to study the long-term fiscal risks and fiscal sustainability in oil-rich 
countries, especially in Russia. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at zbogetic@worldbank.org.  
about five years in addition to keeping total expenditure 
levels at a relatively low 31.5 percent of GDP, 
consistent with long-term social expenditure needs and 
requirements of long-term fiscal sustainability. Following 
a period of adjustment, if Russia would restrain its long-
term non-oil deficits to the permanent income (PI) 
equivalent of its oil revenues as proposed in this paper, 
its fiscal policy will return to long-term sustainable path. 
The long-term, sustainable level of non-oil fiscal deficit 
is estimated at about 4.3 percent of GDP. With the 2009 
actual non-oil fiscal deficit of about 14 percent of GDP, 
this implies significant and sustained fiscal adjustment 
over the medium term. The expenditure needs of the 
social security system as well as a reduction in key non-oil 
taxes represent a major fiscal risk to all scenarios.  
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I. Framing the problem 
This paper elaborates a few simple ideas as it considers consequences of major fiscal 
risks for Russia’s long-term fiscal outlook and sustainability. First, Russia’s oil 
revenues are uncertain and volatile. Second, public expenditure pressures that Russia is 
facing are certain and sizeable. And third, with Russia’s budget, exports and the structure 
of its economy highly dependent on the oil and gas sector, large shocks and volatility will 
continue to define Russia’s economic environment. 
Russia’s strong pre-crisis public finances have deteriorated because of massive oil 
price, growth, revenue, and expenditure shocks during the global crisis. The oil price 
has collapsed from over $140 per barrel in mid-2008 to $40-50 range in early 2009 
before recovering somewhat to $50-60 in the second quarter 2009 and then to $70 range 
in the fall 2009. The oil shock was compounded by large capital outflows and sharp 
tightening of external financing conditions. As a result, domestic liquidity dried up and 
output plummeted. The severity of the crisis was such that it fundamentally altered the 
medium-term growth path of the Russian economy compared to the one expected before 
the crisis.  
Taking into account the 7.9 percent decline in real GDP in 2009, the Russian economy 
is now expected to reach pre-crisis size only towards the end of 2012. With the collapse 
of oil prices, oil revenue base has shrunk dramatically, non-oil revenues declined with 
economic activity while social expenditure pressures increased. As a result, federal 
budget balance has swung from a surplus of 4 percent of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of over 
6 percent in 2009 with deficits likely to persist in medium term. In this environment, the 
government has shifted its policy of no borrowing to modest amounts of domestic and 
external borrowing in 2010-11 to supplement the drawdown of resources from its fiscal 
Reserve Fund.  
The global crisis and structural vulnerabilities of Russia’s budget raise fundamental 
questions for fiscal policy. How can Russian government sustain a prolonged period of 
this difficult fiscal and external environment? What would be the likely impact of the 
economic crisis on medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability? What are the fiscal 
deficit implications of various sustainability scenarios and what does it imply for the 
scale and speed of fiscal adjustment? How should fiscal policy be implemented to 
minimize the risks of such shocks and maintain prudent fiscal stance over the long term? 3 
 
Finally, does Russia’s current fiscal policy stance guarantee sustainability in the long-
term or additional fiscal rules may be needed? 
The paper ponders these questions at a time when Russia faces a balancing act of 
limiting the much larger-than-anticipated economic and social impact of the crisis 
while controlling public finances and supporting economic recovery.  This paper aims 
to provide a contribution to the current fiscal policy debate in Russia. It has also informed 
the discussions in the Ministry of Finance about the 2010-12 budget. 
 
II. Questions  asked 
The macroeconomics of fiscal policy in Russia has long been dominated by oil. Oil is 
the main export earner and the largest source of government revenues. The 
macroeconomic issues related to oil are twofold. The first set of questions concerns oil 
revenues and expenditures directly: how to allocate oil revenues over spending today and 
spending tomorrow in order to maintain sustainable fiscal policy over the long term. The 
second group of problems concerns the macroeconomic consequences of spending out of 
oil wealth for any given intertemporal allocation of spending the oil wealth. In this paper, 
we largely focus on the first set of questions, although the analysis touches on the latter. 
Moreover, we ask how long-term public expenditure pressures for additional social 
spending arising from changing demography of the Russian population are likely to affect 
its long-term fiscal position.  
How much should Russia spend every year, given the likely, gradually declining path 
of oil revenues in the medium term? All oil rich countries face this question, and Russia 
is no exception. While Russia’s oil and gas reserves are expected to last well into this 
century, this question is less directly associated with the amount of oil and gas reserves as 
it is in other countries where such reserves are expected to last much less (e.g., 
Azerbaijan). 
In Russia, price uncertainty is a more important problem: historically prices have 
tended to return to a relatively stable band of circa 25 ~ 35 dollars (in constant 2006 
prices) after prolonged periods of high volatility and high (or low) prices, though there 
are now indications that long-term oil prices are likely to  trend higher. The pre-crisis 
boom has ended and prices have come down significantly, to the $40-60 range and given 
the sluggish global growth outlook they are unlikely to return to the lofty levels before 
global crisis. In this environment, in deciding what level of expenditure out of oil 
revenues is sustainable and equitable in relation to future generations, a certain degree of 
conservatism is therefore advisable: guessing that oil prices will remain high while prices 
drop to low level will cause major macroeconomic adjustment problems. But guessing 
that prices will be low while they turn out high has much more pleasant consequences, 
which has been the case so far: an unexpected surplus and a decision how to allocate 
additional revenues to expenditure programs. The latter “guessing strategy” about oil 
prices—an important choice for fiscal policy--means that benefits of high oil prices in 
terms of productive spending are somewhat delayed but will typically lead to more 
conservative spending patterns and lower risk of a “Dutch disease” in response to high oil 
revenue inflows. 4 
 
But in addition to expenditure level, the composition of expenditure also matters. This 
is especially important in countries like Russia, where large public investment needs 
persist and oil money offers a major source of financing such needs. In a way, this means 
transferring one asset from underground (oil wealth) into another on the ground (public 
infrastructure). However large increases in public infrastructure spending run the risk of 
waste and corruption, thereby wasting the oil wealth for the benefit of few with the power 
to “capture” oil rents and its distribution. Also, infrastructure projects are lumpy and once 
underway, even when clear failures, they are often long-lasting and very expensive to 
slow down or stop. Thus, the welcome shift towards public investments to meet a 
country’s legitimate infrastructure needs also introduces inflexibility in government 
expenditures as a larger share of expenditures gets tied up in costly projects with long 
gestation period. This raises the issue of the quality of project appraisal and selection and 
project implementation to avoid the “white elephant” public projects that provide no 
economic benefits but carry massive public costs. 
The second group of problems deals with the macroeconomic consequences of the 
revenue flows and the spending patterns decided upon. Two stand out: first the 
exchange rate consequences of spending out of oil revenues; and two the issue of 
volatility. To begin with the second, oil revenues are highly volatile, even when quantities 
are relatively easy to predict, because price volatility is high. This makes oil revenue a 
highly uncertain source of income even when production levels are relatively stable. 
In many countries, increased oil income has translated almost one-for-one into 
increased public expenditure, and often even more than one-for-one
1. High future oil 
income facilitates capital market access, which in turn explains why many oil economies, 
in fact, substantially increased their debt levels, their higher income notwithstanding. As 
a consequence, many oil-rich countries have ended up in debt crises once prices 
unexpectedly declined.  
 
III. The global crisis: A new challenge for fiscal policy 
 
Over the past 9 years before the economic crisis (1999-2008), Russia’s fiscal policy has 
been prudently conservative, providing a buffer from deeper consequences of the 
current economic crisis. After a decade of high growth, the Russian economy is 
experiencing a major recession in the wake of the global financial crisis. While Russia’s 
strong short-term macroeconomic fundamentals make it better prepared than many 
emerging economies to deal with the crisis, its underlying structural weaknesses and high 
dependence on the price of a single commodity make its impact more pronounced than 
otherwise. As a result, Russia’s real GDP contracted in 2009 by 7.9 percent, compared 
with the positive 5.6 percent growth in 2008. The fiscal surplus from last year turned into 
a sizable deficit.  
While reserve fund has so far served Russia very well, the question arises about the 
future.  In this paper, we show that for Russia’s fiscal policy to be effective on a 
                                                 
1 see for example Budina and van Wijnbergen (2007) for an extreme example. 5 
 
permanent basis, such current fiscal allocation rule for the reserve fund and future 
generations fund could usefully be complemented by an additional rule for  non-oil 
primary fiscal deficit. The World Bank’s Fiscal Sustainability Analysis tool (FSA) 
presented in the annex is designed to analyze the interaction between these two rules (oil 
fund allocation rule and non-oil primary deficit rule). 
The other macro issue--exchange rate management in oil-rich countries--has attracted 
considerable research and policy attention. The first observation is that high spending 
unavoidably falls to a large extent on goods and services where international trade offers 
only an imperfect substitute, or none at all, such as construction. This, in turn, implies 
that high spending inevitably puts upward pressure on the prices of those goods and 
services, with a real appreciation as a result. For given expenditure levels, therefore, the 
authorities have no choice on the real exchange rate consequences, only on how they 
come about. This depends in large part on the nature of the monetary-exchange regime. 
One option is a gradual revaluation of the nominal exchange rate, so as to effect the 
required real appreciation. If that option is not chosen, domestic goods end up 
underpriced given the state of demand for them, and high inflation will result, the other 
way of effecting a real appreciation. It is important to realize that such inflationary 
pressures are essentially fiscal in nature, related to expansionary fiscal policy; monetary 
tightening will mostly not be an appropriate response in this environment. 
Real appreciation, unavoidable or not, always raises the issue of competitiveness and 
the survival of traditional manufacturing industries. Key is to point out that such 
diversification concerns are appropriate only when the appreciation is expected to be 
temporary. But in countries like Russia, where oil income is likely to last for a century or 
more, a real appreciation in line with increased but sustainable expenditure levels does 
not call for specific support to industries in traded sectors; that will only result in open 
ended subsidy programs which in fact, when having any effect, will lead to further 
pressure on the real exchange rate. 
In this paper we argue that: 
In the long-term: 
(1)  The permanent income (PI) approach to spending out of oil wealth 
provides a long-term solution to the problems mentioned.  
(2)  By choosing a spending level that can be maintained indefinitely in 
real terms (which is what the PI approach amounts to), future 
generations share in the oil wealth. 
(3)  A constant level of spending (in real terms) greatly reduces the 
volatility of government expenditure, thereby reducing the problems 
created by the volatility of oil revenues. 
(4)  Since at the PI level spending can be maintained forever, there is no 
such thing as the post-oil economy; oil income is saved initially and its 




In the short- to medium-term: 
(5)  The global crisis has dramatically altered the short- and medium-term 
fiscal outlook, by pushing the federal fiscal balance from a surplus of 4 
percent to a deficit of over 6 percent of GDP, hence requiring 
significant fiscal adjustment beginning in 2010 for fiscal balance to 
return to sustainable levels. 
(6)  Fiscal adjustment required is likely to be sizeable and sustained over 
several years; it will require both revenue and expenditure measures 
and a shift in the past policy of no borrowing. 
(7)  Expanding the non-oil revenue base will be key to improving structure 
and the stability of fiscal revenues. 
(8)  Improving the composition and effectiveness of public expenditures 
will both be needed in order to sustain required fiscal adjustment. 
In the remainder of this paper we first sketch the background of the analysis, a bird’s eye 
view of recent macroeconomics in Russia, focusing on oil, growth, and the real exchange 
rate (Section IV). We then introduce the permanent income (PI) concept, show the 
outcome in terms of sustainable spending levels, and explore the interaction between the 
PI spending rule, various complementary rules on non-oil deficits and the sustainability 
of the fiscal program that results (V). In section VI, we offer concluding remarks and 
some policy implications.  
IV.  Russia’s economic and fiscal developments, 1995-2008 
A.  Fiscal laxity and financial indiscipline led to the currency crash 1998 
The break-up of the Soviet Union and Russia’s transition to a market economy in the 
early 1990s was marked by tumultuous economic and fiscal crises: a sharp drop in 
output, large fiscal deficits, hyperinflation, massive exchange rate depreciation and public 
debt levels well above 100 percent (Figure 1). In 1995, Russia embarked on a 
macroeconomic stabilization program, supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This program was an exchange rate-based stabilization, to be supported by fiscal 
adjustment, and microeconomic structural reforms designed to stimulate growth. This 
program initially succeeded in bringing down inflation drastically. 7 
 
Figure 1: Russia: Evolution of Public Debt and Real GDP 
 
Source: World Bank. 
But, as with most unsuccessful exchange-rate based stabilization programs, Russia’s 
program’s ultimate failure was traced to the lack of supporting fiscal adjustment and 
structural reforms. The pervasive non-cash settlements and barter nonpayment system 
resulted in de facto “soft budget constraints” on firms and led to a complete breakdown 
of financial discipline, delaying the fiscal adjustment process. The financial indiscipline 
with massive implicit subsidies amounting to about 10 percent of GDP resulted in 
declining tax collections, rising government debt, higher interest rates, and poor growth 
performance (Pinto, Drebentsov, Morozov 2000). These factors reinforced each other, 
contributing to the general financial and currency crisis in 1998. The lack of fiscal 
adjustment resulted in a renewal of inflationary pressures and real appreciation right at 
the time when external variables, in particular the price of oil, moved against Russia. 
The consequent real appreciation presaged the ultimate currency crash. The real 
appreciation that resulted from an attempt to maintain an overvalued nominal exchange 
rate in the face of high and rising domestic inflation masked underlying negative debt 
dynamics but was clearly unsustainable. As so many exchange rate based stabilization 
programs that were not backed up by credible fiscal adjustment, this program, too, ended 
in a crash, a crash that was probably brought forward by the contagion effects from the 
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Figure 2: Russia: Inflation and Nominal Depreciation 
Figure 3: Russia: Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), 1995=100  
 
Eventually, a major devaluation (Figure 2, 3) coupled with debt restructuring and, finally, 
substantial fiscal adjustment brought the overvaluation to an end and set the Russian 
economy on a path towards sustainable growth. 
 
B.  But since 1999, Russia was set on a path of rapid recovery and growth  
After the 1998 crisis, Russia experienced remarkable economic recovery and rapid 
growth that continued until the arrival of the global crisis in mid-2008. High oil prices 
provided strong winds in the sails of the Russian economy. But prudent fiscal policy with 
continuous fiscal surpluses, declining public debt and rising reserves accumulated in the 
Stabilization Fund have helped strengthen policy fundamentals and improved underlying 
policy environment for growth (Figure 4). Indeed, the Russian economy expanded by an 
annual average growth rate of almost 7 percent during 1999-2007 (Table 1). In 2007, real 
output grew at 8.1 percent with signs of the economy “overheating.” Russia’s nominal 
dollar GDP went from $300 billion in 2001 to about $1.3 trillion in 2007, making it one 
of the dozen largest economies in the world. Initially, output growth was driven by strong 
export growth and import compression; but from 2000 onwards, domestic demand was 
the driver of Russian growth, in particular buoyant household consumption and business 
investment (Figure 5). Comparing the 1998-09 and 2008-09 crises, it is clear that external 























































































































































shocks were stronger and recovery likely to be longer during the current, global crisis 
(Figures 6a-6b). 
Figure 4: Russia: Fiscal Surpluses Accompanied with Accelerating Growth 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance data. 
Figure 5: Russia: Contributions to growth, in percent, 1996-2007 
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
Figure 6: Oil and Capital Outflow Shocks Were 
Stronger in 2008--09 than in 1998-99 
Figure 7.  Recovery is slower in 2008-09 than in 
1998-09 
1/ Oil prices: Change between Oct ’97-Dec ’98 versus Jul ’08-Jan ’09 
2/ Capital flows: For 1998-99, e-o-p change from 1997 (USD -18.2 billion) to 1998 (USD -21.7 billion); for 2008-09, e-o-p 
change from 2007 (USD 81.2 billion) to 2008 (USD -130 billion) 
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Table 1.1.  Main macroeconomic indicators, 2006-09 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP  growth,  %  7.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 
Industrial  production  growth,  y-o-y,  %  6.3 6.3 2.1 -10.8 
Fixed capital investment growth, %, y-o-y  16.7  21.1  9.8  -17.0 
Federal government balance,  %  GDP  7.4 5.5 4.0 -6.4 
Inflation (CPI), % change , e-o-p  9.0  11.9  13.3  8.8 
Current  account,  billion  USD  95.6 76.6 98.9 46.0 
Unemployment, % (ILO definition) (period 
average)  7.2 6.1 6.3 8.4 
Memo:  Oil prices, Urals (USD a barrel)  61.2  69.5  95.1  61.4 
Reserves (including gold) billion USD, e-o-p  303.7  478.8  427.1  425.0 
Source: Rosstat, CBR, Ministry of Finance, Bloomberg. 
* Preliminary estimate by Ministry of Economic Development. 
**  Preliminary World  Bank staff estimate. 
Robust growth, higher oil prices and structural fiscal reforms that eliminated non-
payments and arrears, transformed the (primary) fiscal deficit into a primary fiscal 
surplus (See Fig. 8a). As a consequence, the public debt-to-GDP ratio declined rapidly 
and foreign exchange reserves reached nearly 40 percent of GDP in 2007 (See fig. 8b). 
Figure 8a. Primary Fiscal Balance     8b. Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
C.  High oil prices boosted recovery, but prudent fiscal policy and fiscal reforms 
were key to strong economic and policy performance 
Russia has certainly benefited from a favorable external environment as oil and metals 
prices recovered and capital inflows resumed. Russia’s oil price increased by more than 
four-fold since 2000 until 2007 (see Fig. 6a). Nevertheless, Russia maintained a very 
conservative fiscal stance: although the non-oil primary fiscal balance (nopd)
2 turned into 
a deficit again in 2000, but this deficit stayed at modest levels of 2 to 4 percent of GDP–– 
until 2007. By comparison, oil fiscal revenues were above 10 percent of GDP from 2005 
onwards (fig. 8a), indicating substantial net savings out of oil revenues. In 2007, the nopd 
is estimated to have expanded further to slightly below 5 percent of GDP, although this is 
still less than a half of total fiscal oil revenues for the same year. 
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In general, Russia has, until late 2007, wisely chosen to reduce spending volatility 
below the levels of oil revenue volatility. This was achieved by diverting a stable flow of 
resources from oil revenues to the budget, and allocating the remainder to a stabilization 
fund. In fact, there is some evidence that Russia’s fiscal policy has in recent years been 
suitably counter-cyclical, despite the natural pro-cyclicality of its oil-dependent fiscal 
revenues; most recently, however, with fiscal relaxation in 2007, it appears that counter-
cyclicality was reversed (see, for example, Spilimbergo 2005, and Bogetic and Fedderke 
2008, Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Russia: Strength of Anti-Cyclicality of Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures 
(correlations with the real output trend; values above zero indicate degree of anti-cyclicality) 
 
Source: Bogetic and Fedderke (2008). 
The prudent fiscal policy stance was also supported by important fiscal reforms. Russia 
introduced many fiscal management innovations in recent years, including: treasury 
management of the budget, a medium-term fiscal framework (a 3-year budget), explicit 
long-term budget planning modeled after best practice in New Zealand and Australia, and 
the introduction of oil revenue management funds modeled after good international 
practice. Since January 1, 2008, the Oil Stabilization Fund was split into the Reserve 
Fund and a National Welfare Fund, which will accumulate oil revenues beyond the 
Reserve Fund maximum of 10 percent of GDP. Simultaneously, the external position 
improved markedly, with a five-fold increase in the trade balance as compared to its 













































Figure 10a. Non-oil Primary Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  10b. Trade Balance, US$ bn 
The conservative fiscal stance and strong external position, aided by high oil prices, 
helped restore confidence and resulted in private capital inflows. In fact, the strong 
fiscal fundamentals, large foreign exchange reserves, and stronger capital account have 
helped Russia weather the short, liquidity crunch in August 2007 and also the ongoing 
global financial crisis. Compared with other Eastern European and CIS countries, 
Russia’s emerging market bond spreads have remained fairly low, in the 200 basis point 
range, similar to those of Poland and Hungary, and have so far moved up marginally; 
they also remain below the average Global Europe EMBI spread. By contrast, more 
vulnerable economies such as Kazakhstan, experienced significant rise in the spreads. 
Importantly, Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) position turned positive since 2000 
onwards, while net private capital inflows soared from almost zero in 2000 back to over 
$80 billion in 2007 (Fig. 11a, b). The rise of FDIs is an important structural development 
in the Russian capital account that is likely to reduce its vulnerability to “sudden stops” 
compared with the previous period. International experience and recent research shows 
that countries with higher share of FDI and equity-like investments (compared with bond, 
bank loans, and trade credits) in total capital flows typically experience lower volatility 
and risk of “sudden stops”, i.e., massive capital outflows (see, for example, Levchenko 
and Mauro 2006).
3 Nevertheless, the level of FDIs to Russia remains comparatively 







                                                 
3 “Sudden stop” is defined here as a drop in net financial flows of 5 percent of GDP or more compared with 
the previous years. In the case of Russia, using 2007 dollar GDP, this indicator would be equivalent to 
about $64 billion. In the event, the “sudden stop” Russia experienced in the last quarter of 2008 was much 
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Figure 11a.Private Capital Flows, US$ billion  11b. Net FDI, US$ billion 
Source: World Bank. 
 
D. But with rising dependence on oil, macro tensions reemerged in 2008  
The strong recovery of oil prices since about 2000 has increased Russia’s dependence 
on oil and gas revenue (See Fig. 10a and b). The share of oil revenues in total fiscal 
revenue increased substantially--from about 10 to 30 percent of GDP. Instead of declared 
policy of diversification, Russia has, de facto, been specializing in oil exports and oil 
fiscal revenues. While this has seemingly not been a problem during the period of high 
oil prices, it remains a major source of major vulnerability and shocks when oil prices 
begin a rapid descent from the recent levels (as was the case since mid-2008). In 2007, oil 
accounted for about 60 percent of total exports. In a word, higher oil revenues allow for 
additional spending room, but they also complicate macroeconomic management and 
lead to an increased dependence on a highly volatile source of income.  
There are two problems with respect to high dependence on oil revenues: volatility of 
oil prices and the exchange rate consequences of spending oil revenues. Oil revenues 
are highly volatile, even when quantities are relatively easy to predict: price volatility is 
high, making oil revenue a highly uncertain source of income even when production 
levels are relatively stable. 
Uncertainty of a major revenue source calls for conservatism in deciding what level of 
expenditure out of oil revenues is sustainable. For example, basing fiscal, especially 
expenditure policy on a prediction of high oil prices while prices turn out low will cause 
major macroeconomic problems of adjustment because expenditure commitments are 
difficult to scale down in mid course and investment projects are lumpy and costly to 
delay or stop. By contrast, basing policy conservatively on relatively low oil prices while 
they turn out higher results in a much more pleasant dilemma: what to do with windfall, 
excess revenues; in practice, it means that expenditure benefits of such windfalls are 
somewhat delayed––and this may be a small price to pay for maintaining fiscal prudence 
and avoiding painful adjustments compared with the case when oil prices turn out much 
lower than planned.  
 
 


































































































































Net FDI DI Abroad FDI in Russia14 
 
Figure 12: Russia’s Increased oil dependence budget (left) and export revenues (right). 
  
In Russia, since 2007, the fiscal stance was becoming more relaxed compared with 
previous years, contributing to the overheating of the economy. The projected federal 
government budgetary surplus for 2007 went down from 4.8 to 2.8 percent, because of 
expenditure increases authorized under the 2007 Budget Law amendment. Total non-
interest expenditure increased from 17 to 20 percent of GDP (compare column 1 and 2, 
Table 2). The approved medium-term fiscal framework entailed a fiscal relaxation that 
under the then prevailing oil price outlook envisaged a small primary surplus (0.3% of 
GDP) in 2008 and essentially balanced budget in 2009-2010 (Table 2). The bulk of the 
planned increase in public expenditures was for infrastructure development and social 
spending to be implemented largely through large state corporations.  
 















Consolidated budget          
Revenues, % GDP  40.2  38.5  n/a  n/a  33.1 
Expenditure, % GDP  34.1 33.7  n/a  n/a  41.3 
Surplus, % GDP  6.1  4.8  n/a  n/a  -8.2 
Non-oil balance, % GDP  -2.9  -5.8  n/a   n/a   
Federal budget          
Revenues, % GDP  23.6  22.3  21.2  16.6  18.6 
Expenditure, % GDP  18.1 18.2  17.5  24.0  25.2 
Surplus, % GDP*  5.4  4.1  3.7  -7.4  -6.4 
Non-oil balance, % GDP  0.6  -6.4  -5.4  -12.5  -14.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Expert Group (EEG).* including quasi-fiscal support to banks. 
The other macro issue, exchange rate management in oil-rich countries, has attracted 
a huge amount of attention. The macroeconomic issue here is that high public spending 
inevitably targets goods and services where international trade offers only an imperfect 
substitute or none at all, such as construction and other “non-traded” goods and services. 
This, in turn, implies that high spending unavoidably puts upward pressure on the prices 
of those goods and services, with a real appreciation of the currency as an unavoidable 
result. Once expenditure levels are set, the authorities have no choice on the real 
exchange rate consequences, only on how they come about. One option through which 
appreciation takes place is a gradual appreciation/revaluation of the nominal exchange 
rate, so as to effect whatever real appreciation is necessary. If that option is not chosen, 
domestic goods end up underpriced given the state of demand for them. The other way of 
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inflationary pressures triggered by excessive expenditures are essentially fiscal in nature, 
related as they are to expansionary fiscal policy; monetary tightening alone will not be 
sufficient to effect desirable degree of disinflation.  
Since 2007, the Russian authorities seemed to have pursued a policy that resisted 
nominal appreciation and attempting to fight inflation while embarking on increasing 
fiscal expenditure. This, in the context of considerable liquidity in the economy and 
negative real interest rates has been an increasingly inconsistent policy mix. In early 
2008, however, the Central Bank of Russia has begun raising interest rates and signaled a 
more flexible exchange rate policy in the future. This has heralded a welcome 
rebalancing of monetary-exchange and fiscal policy towards more active interest rate and 
more flexible exchange rate policy, which was accelerated later during the global crisis. 
But the challenge remains to maintain public expenditure levels in the future consistent 
with the reduction of inflation while meeting legitimate social and infrastructure 
investment needs in the coming years.  





Box1:  Russia’s anti-crisis policy response in late 2008 and 2009 
The Government has implemented a set of fiscal measures to contain the impact of the crisis. The total 
fiscal cost of measures implemented in 2008 and 2009 amount to more than 2.9 trillion rubles or 6.7 percent of 
GDP (box table 1). These measures were effective in preventing a currency and banking crisis but less so in 
cushioning the impact on the real economy and the poorest households, although measures targeting the 
broader middle class (e.g., increases in public sector wages and pensions) that were planned before the crisis 
were implemented during the crisis, thereby cushioning the overall social impact (Bogetic and Smits 2010). 
Box Table 1: Summary of anti-crisis fiscal measures in 2008 and 2009 (percent of GDP)  
 2008  2009  Total 
Strengthening the financial sector  1.9  1.4  3.3 
Recapitalization and other direct support  0.8  0.2  1.0 
Subordinated loans  1.1  1.2  2.3 
Promoting economic growth  0.7  1.8  2.5 
Public spending on goods and services  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Fiscal stimulus aimed at firms  0.5  1.7  2.2 
Fiscal stimulus aimed at households  0.1  ..  0.1 
Protecting socially vulnerable  ..  0.3  0.3 
Of which labor market policies (including unemployment)  ..  0.3 0.3 
Transfers to regions to support anti-crisis measures, introduced 
by sub-national governments (social programs, support to firms). 
.. 0.7  0.7 
Total 2.6  4.1  6.7 
Note: Excludes quasi-fiscal and monetary measures. 
Source: World Bank estimates; Government of Russia. 
Compared with other G-20 countries, Russia’s “fiscal stimulus” has been large (more than the 
internationally recommended 2 percent of GDP) (box figure 1). This seems appropriate in view of (i) the 
much larger growth deceleration Russia has experienced than many other G-20 countries; (ii) weak 
macroeconomic stabilizers, and (iii) large fiscal reserves accumulated in the oil Reserve Fund (about 8 percent 
of GDP).  
Box figure 1: Estimated size of fiscal stimulus measures in G-20 countries (percent of GDP). 
 
Source: Data for nonRussia G-20 countries, IMF (based on packages announced through late February). The figures do not include (i) 
below-the-line operations, (ii) measures that were already planned for, and (iii) banking-sector support measures.   
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E.  And the banking system vulnerabilities are rising  
In recent years before the global crisis, resistance to nominal appreciation in the face 
of upward pressure on the real exchange rate, with financial conditions, offered the 
banks a one-way bet. In this environment, attempts to sterilize capital inflows lead to 
high domestic interest rates while exchange rate pressure is up towards an appreciation. 
With ample global liquidity and low global interest rates, Russia’s banks and 
corporations were able to borrow cheaply abroad, earn high interest rates by lending at 
home, and expected to make additional capital gain on their foreign exchange exposure 
(Figure 11).  
 
Figure 13: Russia: Increased forex borrowing by banks (A) and corporations (B) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
Time and again, as observed among other oil exporters that did not accept the real 
exchange rate consequences of their spending plans, this resulted in rising bank 
fragility. The high foreign exchange exposure that resulted threatened to wipe out large 
parts of bank equity and a substantial part of deposits if and when oil prices unexpectedly 
fall and the anticipated currency appreciation evaporates and rapidly turns into 
depreciation.  
 
The banking sector entered the global financial crisis in a relatively strong position. At 
the end of 2008, Russia’s banks enjoyed relatively sound financial indicators, with strong 
solvency (average capital adequacy ratio of 15.5%), high profitability (return on equity of 
22.7%), low non-performing loans (2.5% of total loans)
4 and adequate liquidity (short 
term liquidity ratio of 72.9%).  
 
However the financial sector indicators masked exposures to liquidity and credit risks. 
Many Russian banks relied, indeed, excessively on nontraditional (foreign) external 
sources of funding. The loan-deposit ratio of the Russian banking system increased from 
                                                 
4 Non-performing loans in Russia are defined as debt-service charges overdue by more than 60 days, 
excluding refinanced and restructured loans.  
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around 126 percent in 2005 to 149 percent in the second half of 2008, reflecting the 
greater reliance of banks on external foreign borrowing. Further, some characteristics of 
loan portfolios exposed the banks to enhanced credit risk.  Firstly, while most corporate 
loans are classified as having medium-term maturities, they are often in fact provided on 
a short-term basis with a rollover agreement and corporate borrowers usually repay these 
loans with their working capital. This arrangement subjects both companies and banks to 
significant liquidity and credit risk. Secondly, with 30 percent of loans denominated in 
foreign currency, Russian banks were exposed to a depreciation of the ruble. Thirdly, the 
concentration of bank lending in the real estate and construction sectors, coupled with a 
high reliance on real estate for collateral, exposed some banks to real estate prices. 
Finally, loans were often made based on stated income rather than documented income or 
audited financial statements, exposing banks to further credit risk. As a result, close 
monitoring financial sector risk and its fiscal implications will be important in the 
aftermath of the crisis, as will sustained supervisory and regulatory reforms required to 
strengthen the financial system in the medium term. 
 
Against this background, Russia’s government has handled the global crisis well but 
long-term fiscal risks are significant.  It implemented a swift and massive set of fiscal 
measures to contain the impact of the crisis. The total fiscal cost of measures 
implemented in 2008 and 2009 amount to more than 2.9 trillion rubles or 6.7 percent of 
GDP (Box 1). The fiscal management and the economic and social impact during the 
crisis was analyzed at length elsewhere (Bogetic and Smits 2010; Bogetic, Smits, Sulla 
and Tesliuc 2010, and Bogetic, Smits and Sulla 2010).  Suffice it to say that the crisis has 
dramatically altered the short term economic, fiscal and social outlook, bringing to the 
fore the issues of longer-term fiscal risks and fiscal sustainability analyzed in this paper.  
V.  Fiscal policy for the next 30 years: 
Fiscal sustainability and managing oil price uncertainty
5 
A.  A framework for fiscal sustainability and managing uncertainty in oil-rich 
countries 
Russia has managed its public finances well. The government has wisely chosen to 
reduce spending volatility below the levels of oil revenue volatility by diverting a stable 
flow of resources from oil revenues to the budget, and allocating the remainder to a 
stabilization fund. In doing so, Russia has moved significantly from complete fiscal 
discretion and lack of expenditure control of the past to sound, rule-based management of 
fiscal policy. Indeed, it could be argued that this was partly key to its economic success 
since 1999. Nevertheless, new expenditure pressures in late 2007 and 2008 could 
potentially result in a return to unsustainable fiscal spending under not unreasonable 
scenarios of lower oil prices and large spending pressures. How could such a scenario be 
avoided? 
In the years leading up to the 2008-09 crisis, expenditures and non-oil revenues 
remained volatile. Figure 13 shows an annual change, measured as a percentage of GDP 
in expenditure, in savings and non-oil revenue as a result of an increase or decrease in 
                                                 
5 This simulations of the fiscal sustainability here are based on Van Wijnbergen and Budina (2008). 19 
 
fiscal oil revenues. An increase in oil revenues can be used to (i) increase expenditures, 
(ii) reduce non-oil revenue base or (iii) increase savings. There has been a considerable 
variation in each of these variables, with significant fluctuation in expenditures. The 
economic crisis and subsequent sharp downward adjustment in oil prices in the second 
half of 2008 has resulted in a (i) large drawdown of fiscal savings, (ii) a decrease in non-
oil revenues.  
 
Figure 13: Changes in fiscal oil and gas revenues (oil shock) and fiscal policy reaction – changes in 
savings, expenditures and non-oil revenues: General Government 
 
Source: World Bank estimates. 
We argue that for Russia’s existing allocation rule to be effective in the long run, it 
could usefully be complemented by a rule on the non-oil primary fiscal deficit. 
Intuitively, the rationale for such a rule can be summarized in that there is no obvious 
point to adding money to one fund with the one hand, and borrowing against future oil 
revenues from another. It is better, in our view, to design and implement a fiscal rule that 
would only spend, in the long run, as much as it is earned, i.e., as much as the “permanent 
income” from oil assets would allow, leaving the stock of assets intact for future 
generations. Such a rule—if pursued consistently--would automatically ensure fiscal 
sustainability, stabilize the level of public expenditures, and establish greater fairness 
between current and future generations, the latter of which would come to enjoy the 
benefits of long-term strong economic performance and oil assets that would remain 
undiminished. The Fiscal Sustainability Analysis tool (FSA) developed at the World 
Bank and presented in the annex is designed to analyze the interaction between these two 
rules (oil fund allocation rule and non-oil primary deficit rule). 
 
B.  Developing scenarios for Russia: Deficit rules, oil income and sustainability  
Assumptions: the value of Russia’s oil wealth, and sustainable spending, and the 
derivation of the permanent income fiscal rule for Russia 
Three strategic questions frame the challenge that Russia faces in managing its oil 
windfall:  
(1)  How much oil revenue should be saved and spent every year or how to 
set meaningful oil fund/non-oil deficit rules? What is the link between 
Oil fund rule and non-oil deficits and what are their implications for 
fiscal sustainability?  20 
 
(2) How to deal with uncertainty and manage oil revenue volatility? and  
(3) What other key (macro or capacity-related) factors constrain the overall 
level of fiscal spending?  
Simulations presented are based on the current World Bank’s average oil price projection 
for 2009-2012 and real price of USD60 per barrel in years after 2013 (Figures 14-15). 
This oil price assumption is based conservatively on expert oil view of long term oil 
prices (World Bank’s Prospects Group 2010). But it is relatively more optimistic that the 
short term oil price assumption used by Russian government (USD 41 per barrel Urals in 
2009 and USD 50 per barrel Urals in 2010). Price of gas is assumed to be correlated to 
price movements of oil. The baseline scenario for oil and gas extraction profile is based 
on the relatively conservative scenario presented in the Government of Russia 2020 
strategy document.  
 
Figure 14: Russia’s oil and gas production volume: 
government strategy 2020 
Figure. 15. Oil price assumption for projections 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates, oil and gas extraction profile based on the Government of Russia, economic development strategy 
2020. 
 
Figure 16: Long-term fiscal revenues from oil and gas in billions of USD 2008. 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates 
The following are some key assumptions. We discount the two streams of future income 
back to 2009 in a Net Present Value calculation. We assume a safe real rate of interest of 21 
 
about 3 percent (equal to the US long-term real rate plus a hundred basis points for 
Russia-specific country risk under “normal” conditions). This is added to a long-term US 
inflation projection of 2.4 percent to arrive at a safe nominal rate of 5.5 percent. But the 
income stream being discounted is not a safe stream, as the two alternative sets of 
assumptions already indicate; they are shrouded in substantial uncertainty
6. To account 
for their riskiness, we add a 3 percent risk premium to the basic safe real rate. Obviously, 
this puts a limit on the “measured uncertainty” called risk but it appears a reasonable 
assumption that would cover the possible level of risk under most conditions in Russia 
based on past experience. 
Under our oil price assumptions, this calculation shows Russia’s oil and gas wealth at a 
total of about US$3 trillion (2009), or 215 percent of projected 2009 GDP. The 
permanent income equivalent of this amount is the constant real annual amount that has 
the same discounted value, this time using the safe real rate for discounting as it is by 
assumption a safe stream.  
This sustainable permanent income equivalent comes out at 79.3 billion in constant 
2009 US dollars, or 4.3 percent of GDP in 2009 (See table 3). Given the stocks, 
extraction rates and other main assumptions, this is the amount that can be safely 
consumed each year out of Russia’s oil revenues without running into sustainability 
problems while sharing out the oil wealth fairly over all current and future generations.  
 
Table 3. Permanent Income Approach to Oil wealth 
Net wealth 
US$ 2009 trillion 
Net oil wealth to 2009 
GDP (%) 
Annuity 1/ 
US$ 2009 billion 
3  215  60.1 
Source: World Bank staff estimates 
Assumption: Real Safe rate of interest =3%, Risk premium=3%, Foreign inflation=2.4% 
Note: All simulations are illustrative at this point. In addition to the assumptions on oil prices and exploitable 
oil reserves, the results depend on the profile of the extraction, the pace of investments, and financial and 
operational decisions of the operators that may change the path of revenue that the government receipts from 
oil operations. 
1 This annuity can be interpreted as the sustainable level of annual spending. 
The Permanent Income (PI) amount is what can be safely spent on an annual basis 
indefinitively, thus allowing future generations to share in equal absolute annual 
amounts (not per capita or as share of their income). The measures of permanent income 
(PI) should be compared to the actual non-oil primary fiscal deficit (nopd), as the nopd 
represents the net claim on non-oil resources, to be covered by the PI amount transferred 
from the Oil Fund.  
C.  A look to Russia’s fiscal future: From the short- to medium- to long-term 
 
A comparison between PI and actual non-oil fiscal balance shows that Russia has 
remained below its sustainable, permanent income (PI) spending limits in all recent 
years except in 2008 and 2009, largely as a result of global economic slowdown. The 
global crisis has resulted in a massive change in medium term growth trajectory of 
Russia’s economy that was anticipated before the crisis (Figure 16). Just before the global 
                                                 
6 See  S. van Wijnbergen (2008), “The Permanent Income Approach in Practice: A Policy guide to Fiscal 
Sustainability for oil rich countries” for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
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crisis, the long-term expenditure pattern was becoming unsustainable due to increases in 
social expenditures. But now, as a result of the crisis, absent fiscal adjustment, the non-oil 
primary deficit will increase sharply well above Permanent Income (PI) spending limits 
(Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17. The level of real GDP in Russia, 2007-2019, seasonally adjusted  
 
Source: After crisis scenario is based on World staff estimates, before crisis scenario is based on assumption of Russia’s 
long-term development strategy 2020. 
 
Figure 18. Non-oil primary deficit as a share of GDP before and after crisis 
scenarios and various fiscal strategies (right) 
Source: World Bank staff estimate 
 
Given the impact of the global crisis,
7 we present various illustrative fiscal strategies for 
the non-oil deficit to GDP ratio nopd:  
1.  A base case “before crisis” scenario, which is guided by the medium term fiscal 
framework broadly outlined in the Russian economic strategy 2020 and three-
year budget adopted before the crisis, envisaging non-oil primary deficits in 
excess of its “permanent income” equivalent in order to accommodate high social 
                                                 




expenditure and infrastructure requirements. Thereafter, we assume that spending 
levels for consolidated government will decline to about 35 percent of GDP, 
while non-oil revenues to GDP ratio, after some improvement, remain at around 
27.5 percent of GDP. The resulting non-oil primary deficit increases initially, 
reaching nearly 6 percent of GDP, but then declines and remains at 3.7 percent till 
the end of the projection period (2040). This scenario is now only an illustrative 
benchmark to show how much the medium to longer term real GDP and fiscal 
outlook has changed after the crisis. This illustrative scenario has been taken over 
by tumultuous events of the global crisis and its impact on Russia. But it does 
serve as comparative, departure point for the more realistic, “after crisis” 
scenarios discussed below. 
2.  “After crisis”, passive, base case scenario, which assumes the impact of the 
global growth recession and the oil price shock of 2008-2009. This scenario 
includes projected decline in Russia’s real GDP in 2009 of 7.9 percent, followed 
by a modest, 3.2 percent recovery in 2010 but, as shown in Figure 17, it assumes 
that Russia will reach its pre-crisis real GDP only in late 2012. This means that 
the global crisis has taken away at least half a decade of prosperity that was 
assumed to be ahead, before the crisis. Assuming that spending plans are the same 
as in the base case scenario, reflecting significant expenditure rigidities, this 
scenario implies that the projected non-oil primary deficit will be much larger 
(exceeding 16 percent of GDP in 2010-11) than the non oil primary deficit under 
the “before crisis” base case. This scenario illustrates the magnitude of fiscal 
dislocation brought about by the crisis if no action is taken and no fiscal 
adjustment effected in the short to medium term. 
3.  A Permanent Income (PI) strategy scenario, which assumes that the non-oil 
deficits in the next five years and beyond are bounded by the government’s 
adoption and implementation of the “permanent income” rule and the associated 
flow of oil revenue to the budget. One implication of this rule is that because the 
economy will be growing, non-oil deficit to GDP ratios will decline in the future. 
This scenario illustrates the “ideal” policy stance for the long term and a long 
term aim towards which fiscal policy should return following the period of 
sustained fiscal adjustment required by the crisis. 
4.  Finally, we also specify two cases of fiscal policy adjustment that spell out ways 
in which fiscal policy could return to a long-term sustainable path: temporary 
and sustained fiscal adjustment scenarios. In both scenarios, the size of fiscal 
adjustment in the period 2010-2012 is equivalent to about 2-3 percent of GDP per 
year, however, in sustained adjustment scenario that extends in medium term, 
fiscal expenditures remain at 31.5 percent of GDP, while under temporary fiscal 
adjustment, expenditure adjustment is not sustained, so that expenditures 
gradually increase towards 35 percent of GDP. Fiscal adjustment in 2010-2012 is 
based on a combination of expenditure (a decrease in expenditures by 1 
percentage points of GDP) and revenue (an increase in non-oil tax base by 1-2 
percentage points of GDP) measures. These scenarios illustrate the need for 
longer term expenditure restraint for fiscal sustainability and lower volatility of 
public finances.  24 
 
5.  We argue that medium term fiscal policy should usefully be guided by an 
approach similar to “permanent” or sustained fiscal adjustment scenario 
outlined here. This approach results in a feasible, sustained fiscal adjustment, 
returning fiscal policy on a long-term sustainable path within a reasonable amount 
of time. But the transition to that scenario will require coordinated and sustained 
revenue, expenditure, and financing measures. The size of adjustment in each year 
will also have to be realistic in order to avoid backsliding. 
 
Table 4: Assumptions for fiscal adjustment scenarios 
AFTER CRISIS with Fiscal adjustment 2010-2012 (temporary)  
Fiscal data (% of GDP)  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 2015  2016  2017 
Non-oil total revenue and grants  27.90  17.50  19.50  21.50  23.50  24.50  25.50 26.50  27.50  27.50 
Non-oil primary expenditure and 
net lending 
33.70  33.50  32.50  31.50  30.50  31.50  32.50 33.50  34.50  35.00 
                     
Size of fiscal adjustment(% of 
GDP) 
  (10.20)  3.00  3.00  3.00  -  - -  -  (0.50) 
..o/w revenue side measures  -  (10.40)  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  - 
..o/w expenditure side measures    (0.20)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  0.50 
                     
AFTER CRISIS with Fiscal adjustment 2010-2015 (sustained) 
Fiscal data (% of GDP)  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 2015  2016  2017 
Non-oil total revenue and grants  27.90  17.50  19.50  21.50  23.50  24.50  25.50 26.50  27.50  27.50 
Non-oil primary expenditure and 
net lending 
33.70  33.50  32.50  31.50  30.50  31.50  31.50 31.50  31.50  31.50 
                     
Size of fiscal adjustment(% of 
GDP) 
  (10.20)  3.00  3.00  3.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  -  - 
..o/w revenue side measures  -  (10.40)  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.00 1.00  -  - 
..o/w expenditure side measures    (0.20)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  1.00  - -  -  - 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. Data for 2008 is based on the data from the Ministry of Finance.  
 
How Fast Does Russia Accumulate Net Debt Under Alternative Scenarios? 
With different fiscal strategies specified, we run the fiscal sustainability model to derive 
illustrative baseline projections for net public debt throughout the projection period. 
Note that as explained in the annex, this framework also incorporates the dynamics of the 
oil fund assets and consequently, an oil fund rule to deal with the large but volatile oil 
revenue in Russia. In Figure 19, we present results of fiscal sustainability analysis for the 
fiscal strategies outlined in the previous section. The diagram shows the net debt to GDP 
ratio, including the Oil Stabilization Fund stock as a negative item, under the various 
spending programs. The starting point is a negative number: the Oil Fund and other 
foreign exchange assets exceed the gross public debt by a substantial margin reflecting 
Russia’s de facto net creditor position. 
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Figure 19. Stress tests for Net Debt-to-GDP  Figure 20. Average oil price in 2008$ 
Source: world bank staff calculations. 
Under the baseline “after crisis” scenario reflecting fiscal strategy with no explicit fiscal 
adjustment (passive scenario), Russia saves and dissaves at the same time: resources 
are added to the oil fund but at the same time the transfers from the fund, by assumption 
equal to the PI equivalent, are not enough to cover the non-oil primary fiscal deficit, so 
gross debt is increasing as a percentage of GDP and Russia becomes a debtor already in 
2011. Under this scenario, social spending pressures (elaborated in previous notes on 
long-term expenditures) result in a 4 percentage points higher expenditure to GDP ratio, 
and corresponding non-oil primary deficits, without offsetting cuts in other expenditures 
or revenue gains. The net result is that net debt decreases further for the first three years, 
but after that oil savings are insufficient to make up for the deficits after transfers from 
the oil fund, so net debt starts growing again. At the end of the planning horizon in 
2040, Russia has eaten up its oil fund assets and other foreign exchange assets it 
started out with, and reaches a net debt position of around 80 percent of GDP.  
Under the “ideal,” Permanent Income rule (PI) scenario, sustainability is, of course, 
not under threat; the net debt position remains basically unchanged over the planning 
horizon. Initial net saving are positive as oil revenues exceed the PI transfer and an nopd 
that exactly matches the PI transfer; later on net savings stop but the overall net debt 
position remains essentially stable. But the point is that the extraordinary scale of the 
global crisis and its impact non Russia (presumably an extremely rare event) has made 
the application of this rule impossible in the short- to medium-term but is shown here as 
an ideal to strive for in medium to long-term. Good news is that Russia’s public debt is 
very low even after the crisis and the country has room to borrow in the next several 
years, thereby making the above-the-line fiscal adjustment less painful than it otherwise 
would be.  
Under the temporary fiscal adjustment scenario,  over a three-year period, social 
spending pressures resume, resulting in a 4-percentage points higher expenditure to GDP 
ratio, and corresponding non-oil primary deficits, without offsetting cuts in other 
expenditures or revenue gains. The net asset position continues to deteriorate after 2021. 
After that date, Russia is a net debtor again, to reach a net debt of 60 percent by 2040, a 
deterioration of no less than 60 percentage points of GDP. The upshot: temporary 
adjustment is a temporary palliative and does not fundamentally improve the country’s 
long term fiscal position. 26 
 
Finally, under the “permanent” or sustained fiscal adjustment scenario—a preferred 
policy scenario--over a longer period of five years including keeping long-term 
expenditures of the consolidated government at relatively low levels of 31.5 percent of 
GDP, fiscal adjustment delivers long-term fiscal improvements. Under this scenario, the 
inevitable, long-term increases in social spending pressures are offset by cuts in other 
expenditures and/or increase in expenditure efficiency on the expenditure side as well as 
expansion of the tax based and government revenues. As a result, Russia’s net debt 
position improves on a long term basis and Russia is able to maintain its net creditor 
position in the long term. Implementing this adjustment, however, requires sustained, 
coordinated actions on revenue, expenditure and financing fronts as well as 
improvements in the effectiveness of public expenditures over time. 
All scenarios are run under the assumption where oil prices fall back to about $60 per 
barrel, but remain constant in real terms thereafter, in line with the current assumptions 
made by the Government and oil experts.  
Three final observations. First, while Russia’s past fiscal prudence has helped limit the 
impact of the global crisis, there is no room for complacency. Russia’s last decade of 
prosperity was partly built on sound fiscal policy and strong macroeconomic 
performance. Now is the time to effect important fiscal adjustment and lock in that 
performance for future generations so that they, too, may enjoy the fruits of stability and 
share in the benefits of oil assets. 
Second, the Permanent Income rule, if applied in Russia in the long run, would resolve 
the fiscal sustainability problem on a lasting basis. Because Russia is running much larger 
non-oil primary fiscal deficit than the sustainable Permanent Income level, formal move 
to this rule requires large fiscal adjustment, but its benefits would be substantial. To make 
it feasible, such sustained fiscal adjustment must be phased and sustained over several 
years.  
Third, to make the permanent income rule operational, it would also be advisable to 
complement such a fiscal deficit strategy (non-oil deficits equal to the permanent income 
level of future oil revenues) with an operational feedback or correction rule that would 
guide changes in fiscal policy from year to year so that any excess over that target level 
of debt implied by PI rule would result in a reduction in non-oil primary deficit by a 
percentage of that excess. This should have a strong impact on confidence; while it does 
not affect the average spending level of the Government, it will greatly reduce the 
variance of debt outcomes and thereby lower any crisis expectations. Moreover, a firm 
and automatic application of this rule should translate in lower costs of debt servicing and 




Just before the global crisis, Russia seems to have left its fiscal problems far behind. A 
glaring lack of fiscal sustainability was at the root of the crisis ten years ago, but high oil 
prices and a remarkably restrained fiscal policy since 1998 seem to have changed the 
policy landscape completely. Russia’s government has turned into a substantial net 27 
 
creditor, as a large part of the windfall gains on oil and gas exports have been saved. 
Arguably, sound fiscal policy has been a key policy contributor to the strong growth 
performance of the Russian economy up to the global crisis in 2008. 
But the rise in non-oil deficit in 2007-08 and, more importantly, the massive impact of 
the global crisis in late 2008 and 2009 have dramatically altered Russia’s economic 
and fiscal outlook.  Unless fiscal policy in the future gradually returns to its sustainable 
path, Russia could again slide back into a debtor nation, any time between 2014 to 2040, 
depending on a particular scenario. Moreover, given the conservatively projected key 
external variables, such scenarios are not improbable. To prevent this from happening, 
Russia will need to implement significant fiscal adjustment in the next several years to 
reduce the non-oil primary deficit to long-term sustainable levels.  
Russia will need to implement sustained fiscal adjustment in the coming years. This 
will require 2-3 percentage point of GDP in fiscal adjustment for about five years in 
addition to keeping total expenditure levels at a relatively low 31.5 percent of GDP, 
consistent with long-term social expenditure needs and requirements of long-term fiscal 
sustainability. The long-term, sustainable level of non-oil fiscal deficit is estimated at 
about 4.3 percent of GDP. With the 2009 actual non-oil fiscal deficit of about 14 percent 
of GDP, this implies significant and sustained fiscal adjustment over the medium term. 
This scale of adjustment is large but in the context of recovering economy and the fiscal 
revenues is feasible, but will need to be implemented and sustained against the 
resurgence of expenditure pressures in line with recovery of oil prices.  
Both revenue and expenditure measures will be needed. On the revenue side, expanding 
the non-oil tax base will be key, including reducing exemptions and raising excise taxes 
(especially on tobacco and alcohol products) that are now below international norms. On 
the expenditure side, cutting unproductive expenditures, especially on the current side 
and prioritizing public investments, improving project selection and project 
implementation will be important. These measures will be important building blocks in 
improving the effectiveness of public expenditures, including better targeting of social 
expenditures. Additional fiscal rules may be required that will automatically ensure fiscal 
sustainability over the long term.  
Following a period of adjustment, if Russia would restrain its long-term non-oil 
deficits to the permanent income (PI) equivalent of its oil revenues as proposed in this 
paper, its fiscal policy will return to long-term sustainable path. Under such policy, 
Russia’s Government will remain a substantial net creditor in perpetuity if it adheres to 
the PI rules on non-oil deficits. Such a scenario would allow future generations to share 
in Russia’s oil wealth and would reduce fiscal risks to low and manageable levels, the 
high volatility of oil prices notwithstanding. By contrast, without such a shift, substantial 
risks will remain, not just from the external environment but also from internal pressures. 
Moreover, it is possible to envisage that more than one shock cumulatively hits the 
economy at the same time, in which case the adverse debt dynamics would accelerate. 
The expenditure needs of the social security system as well as a reduction in key non-
oil taxes represent a major fiscal risk to all scenarios. Other, short-term risks exist too: a 
reduction in VAT rate (something that has been backed by considerable commercial 
lobby in Russia) that would reduce the effective tax rate by about 4 percentage points, for 28 
 
example, without any compensating base expansion threatens to add at least 1.5 
percentage point of GDP to the time path of non-oil deficits, once again threatening fiscal 
sustainability. If particularly adverse external developments are added, Russia could 
again experience difficult conditions and a scenario where oil prices return to their long 
term historical average of $35 (in 2008 dollars) and net debt-to-GDP ratios quickly move 
into triple digit territory. 
Other, less immediate risks exist. The pre-crisis policy of resisting nominal appreciation 
while expanding spending programs results in both high domestic interest rates and 
expectations of currency appreciation. This has resulted in strong incentives for 
commercial banks to take on foreign exchange risk by borrowing in dollars or Euros and 
lending in rubles, a scenario that may weaken the banking system if the exchange rate 
falls rather than rises in the future. This is not an impossible scenario although Russia 
managed the economic crisis well. This policy has, indeed, improved during the crisis 
towards more active use of interest rates and more flexible exchange rate policy; it will 




Bandiera, l., N. Budina, M. Klijn and S. van Wijnbergen, (2007), “The How to of Fiscal  
 Sustainability  Analysis:  a Manual”, with N. Budina, World Bank Policy Research  
  Working Paper No. 4170, 2007. 
 
Bogetic, Z. and J. Fedderke (2008), “The Cyclicality of Russia’s Fiscal Policy,” draft paper 
(April 2008). 
 
Bogetic, Z. and K. Smits (2010), “Fiscal Stimulus During Russia's Financial Crisis 2008-09,” 
World Bank’s Policy Research Paper series, forthcoming.  
 
Bogetic, Z. and K. Smits, V. Sulla and E. Tesliuc (2010), “Labor Lost: Labor and Poverty 
Effects During Russia’s Financial Crisis 2008-09,” World Bank’s Policy Research Paper 
series, forthoming. 
 
Bogetic, Z. and K. Smits, V. Sulla (2010), “Fraternal Twins: Russia’s Financial Crises 
Compared,” World Bank’s Policy Research Paper series, forthoming. 
 
Budina, N. and S. van Wijnbergen (2006), “Nigeria’s growth record: Dutch Disease or Debt  
  Overhang?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4256. 
 
Budina, N. and S. van Wijnbergen (2007): “Debt, Deficits and Inflation in Turkey:is  
  There a Fiscal Dominance Problem?” , mimeo, University of Amsterdam. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2009). Article IV Consultation Staff Report (August), 
www.imf.org 
 
Levchenko, Andrei and Paolo Mauro (2006). “Do Some Forms of Financial Flows 
Protect from Sudden Stops?” International Monetary Fund, Policy Research 
Working Paper series, 2006/202. 
 
Pinto, B., V. Drebetsov, A. Morozov (2000), “Give Growth and Macroeconomic Stability 
a Chance in Russia: Harden Budget Constraint by Eliminating Non-Payments,” 
World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2234 (April 2000), World Bank, 
Washington D.C.  
 
Schabert, A. and S. van Wijnbergen (2008), “Soverign Default Risk and the Stability of 
Inflation targeting regimes”, mimeo, University of Amsterdam. 
 
Spilimbergo, Antonio (2005). “Measuring the Performance of Russia’s Fiscal Policy,” 
IMF Working Paper 05/241, International Monterary Fund, Washington D.C. 
 
Van Wijnbergen, Sweder van (2008), “The Permanent Income Approach in Practice: a 
Policy guide to Sustainable Fiscal Policy in Oil Rich Countries”, mimeo,  
University of Amsterdam 30 
 
 
Van Wijnbergen, S. and N. Budina (2008). “Fiscal Policy in Russia: On Deficits, Oil 
revenues and Fiscal Sustainability,” March, 2008, mimeo. 
 
World Bank (2008, 9). Russian Economic Reports, Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. (www.worldbank.org/ru). 
 
World Bank (2010). Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth (February), 
Washington D.C. (www.worldbank.org/gep2010). 
 31 
 
ANNEX I: The Fiscal Sustainability Tool
8 
The model utilizes simulation methods to forecast the distribution and evolution of net 
public debt/assets, accounting for various rules governing oil fund allocations, the non-oil 
primary deficit and foreign debt accumulation. It consolidates the government’s fiscal 
accounts with the Oil Stabilization Fund (like for example Norway’s Oil Fund)
9 and the 
central bank’s foreign-currency reserves. Fiscal policy is captured by restrictions on the 
size of the non-oil primary deficit (NOPD) of the public sector plus the rule for allocating 
current oil revenues from the OSF to the budget. Fiscal sustainability analysis then means 
examining the impact of the non-oil primary fiscal deficit and OSF allocation rules on net 
debt levels, including monies saved in the OSF under various scenarios for the oil 
price.Moreover, it allows for explicit analysis of the effects of uncertainty not just 
through scenario analysis but also through full stochastic analysis allowing Value-at-Risk 
assessments. A schematic of the proposed framework is shown in Figure ANNEX II.1. 
 
Figure ANNEX II.1.Fiscal Sustainability Framework for Oil-Rich Countries 
 
                                                 
8 For a full description cf Bandiera e.a., 2007. 
9 Although we refer to oil, any other natural resource can be substituted, like Chile’s Copper Stabilization 
Fund. 







development goals, fiscal 
efficiency and transparency. 
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